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Abstract
Over recent years, many forms of inter-organisational collaboration have gained in
popularity. IT outsourcing is a particular form of collaboration and, while cost savings and
other benefits forecast in the early days of the outsourcing boom have not always
eventuated, the approach has retained much of its popularity. It is becoming increasingly
apparent, however, that we still have some way to go in understanding how outsourcing
arrangements actually work in practice. In particular the many failed ventures indicate that
managing these partnerships is no trivial matter. Here, we report on an IT outsourcing
venture, where interface management’s failure to take into account the needs of one of its
most successful Divisions destroyed a major source of that Division’s competitive advantage
– its information systems support function. We describe how that Division developed and
attempted to employ a system dynamics model to protect its operations and functions. We
then use a further model based on the same paradigm to illustrate how power/ political
considerations meant that its efforts were always likely to fail.
Keywords
Outsourcing, organisational power and politics, system dynamics

INTRODUCTION
…Unless and until we are willing to come to terms with organisational power
and influence, and admit that the skills of getting things done are as
important as the skills of figuring out what to do, our organisations will fall
further and further behind. The problem is, in most cases, not an absence of
insight or organisational intelligence. Instead the problem is one of passivity.
(Pfeffer, 1992:12)
As an array of organisational collaborations gain momentum in popularity, it is becoming
clear just how difficult it really is to manage complex relationships between partners and,
more specifically, it appears that alliances are much easier to form than to manage. This
paper outlines how, in the rush to align with others, management often unthinkingly destroys
the very basis of competitive advantage residing in previous organisation designs and work
practices. We report on a recently completed study of an IT outsourcing venture, in which
the particular needs of one of the outsourcing company’s most strategically important and
highly successful Divisions were neglected during both the establishment of the venture and
in the detailed interface planning phase. The impact on the Division’s IT operations – a
major source of its success – was devastating. Moreover, our study graphically illustrates
the effect that dysfunctional political activity can have on the crucial issue of the retention
and cultivation of the intellectual capital residing in expert personnel.
Alongside a more traditional concern with issues of structure and human resources
management, sometimes enlivened by acknowledging the cultural domain, over the last
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decade there has been a rising interest in the dimensions of power and politics to explain
some of the richer and often intangible aspects of organisation processes and behaviour.
This is hardly surprising given increasing organisation problems related to distribution and
inequities of power, competition for resources, the link between power, authority, and
leadership, and especially the challenge of the ongoing dynamics of organisational change
that threaten traditional power bases. As Buchanan and Badham (1999:1) put it:
There is clearly enhanced scope for political manoeuvring in a less wellordered and less disciplined organisational world. There is also clearly a
greater need for a critical understanding of the shaping role of political
behaviour in such a context.
We have also moved from a romantic view of power as personal attributes, through a
modernist approach that associates power with structure and position, to a postmodern view
that understands power being about relationships. There is also the acceptance of the ways
in which current change management is inextricably linked with power and politics in
increasingly complex, uncertain and ambiguous organisational environments. As Mintzberg
(1983) emphasised some time ago, being an effective change agent implies a willingness
and capability to engage in the political process of organisation change. On the other hand,
it is equally important to recognise the interdependency of the cast of characters in change
and the power and politics enmeshed in their actions and interactions.
While these changes in theoretical and practical developments have occurred they have
largely focussed on micro-individual and team relationships within organisations. What
hasn’t been widely discussed is the nature of such power and politics from both a strategic
and tactical perspective across organisations in partnering and collaborative relationships.
This includes both the more positive and negative faces of power and politics.
Space limitations do not permit a detailed presentation of our study. Briefly, the approach
adopted is pluralistic (rather than unitary), multidisciplinary, largely qualitative and inductive.
Semi-structured interviews, group-based model development and observation were major
tools. Instead of the traditional economics or strategy approach, the authors employed an
inter-organisational field approach (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997) coupled with a systems
dynamics perspective. We do acknowledge the difficulty, however, of capturing soft or
behavioural variables central to collaboration, given the complexity and multidimensionality
of inter-organisational relationships (Parkhe, 1993).
Our paper is organised as follows: in the following section we briefly review some theoretical
issues surrounding inter-organisational collaboration. The second and third sections contain
our case study narrative and a system dynamics view of some crucial aspects of the
outsourcing operation respectively. We then present an extended model, developed to
highlight power/ political impacts. Finally, we present our conclusions.

CHANGE, COLLABORATION AND THE ‘DARK SIDE’
Inter-organisational collaboration and cooperation, whilst not new to this decade, has been
revisited by scholars and practitioners, fascinated by its energetic adoption as a means of
gaining competitive advantage. Cooperative relationships may be defined as those special
affiliations between at least two organisations, aimed at pooling resources, having joint
activities, and grounded in a strategic base designed to enhance competitive advantage.
Such relationships should, ideally, be guided by a sound respect for organisational
autonomy and individuality, and emphasise some type of long term or permanent
commitment. They range from very tight approaches, such as joint ventures, to broader
strategic alliances and more arm’s length, extremely loose, forms of collaboration. What
appears necessary and sufficient for strategic alliances per se is retention of independence,
sharing of benefits and performance control, and maintaining ongoing contributions to one or
more strategic areas (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995).
Cooperative strategies are changing the very face of organisational life, especially in hightechnology organisations. Furthermore, what is evident in the burgeoning growth of interorganisational collaboration, is its increasing complexity and the way it alters the very nature
of business, competition, organising and management, both nationally and internationally.
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Collaborative ventures move beyond mere economic rationalism and formal transaction
processes. As complex, multi-tiered social systems, they involve social and political
dimensions – both intra and inter-organisational, and the vital nexus between organisation
and external environment (including government). Not surprisingly then, some of the central
planks of effective organisational collaboration reside in issues of appropriate coordination
approaches, trust, communication, and the vitality of interpersonal relationships. The role of
cultural compatibility is also important (More and McGrath, 1996).
Kumar and Thibodeaux (1990) have emphasised that when change is major and
transformative, the political awareness and facilitation that is appropriate at more microdepartmental and sub-systems changes, must be matched with actual political intervention
involving key stakeholders and an array of political tactics – both overt and covert. In the
case study outlined in this paper, the major change initiative was that of outsourcing, utilising
specialist IT suppliers to supposedly do a more efficient job than that formerly done in-house
by Gigante.
While dominant rationales for outsourcing follow the old adage of ‘stick to your knitting’ re:
central core competencies, achieving critical mass, and the like (see e.g. Caddy et al.,
2001), the practice really took off in the 1990s, following hard on the heels of the
reengineering boom. Drawn on by the lure of major savings, what Deal and Kennedy (2000)
refer to as ‘corporate amputation’ continues apace, with major firms such as DuPont, J.P.
Morgan and Lucent Technology outsourcing their IT businesses. Many specialist employees
with scarce competencies are also riding high in this environment.
Yet there is a dark side to this form of change and inter-organisational collaboration. Some
employees lose their jobs and many organisations lose their valuable in-house skills and
control of their destinies. For many the bubble of savings bursts to reveal illusion and
inefficiencies. No wonder, then that Deal and Kennedy (2000) believe that the since the late
1970s, the single most culturally destructive management trend is that of outsourcing,
especially in its dysfunctional impact on participation, loyalty, and organisational
commitment.
From a theoretical perspective there is much to be done, although the pace of research in
this area has certainly accelerated over the last few years. As Ebers (1997:15) suggests:
“…we still have some way to go before we can claim that we sufficiently understand when,
where, why, and how organisations form which kinds of inter-organisational relationships
and to what effect.” Moreover he emphasises the importance of two under-researched yet
important areas – possible costs and dynamics of such relationships, areas touched on in
this paper.

CASE STUDY: AN IT OUTSOURCING VENTURE
Gigante is a large Australian company involved in the development and provision of IT
products and services. The company operates mainly in its local Australian market where it
is one of the dominant players. In 1992, recognising the need for a much greater presence in
the international arena, it took over a much smaller player, Cowboys Inc., who were already
operating very successfully in what was, essentially, the same business. Although presented
to the public as an amicable merger, the marriage was, in effect, a hostile takeover. One
immediate impact of this was that many of Cowboys best and most experienced technical
and managerial staff walked out the door in the first 12 months following the merger.
Despite this, Cowboys (now re-badged as Gigante’s International Division) continued to
operate very successfully. Rapid response to new circumstances (particularly technological
advances, new customer requirements and competitors actions) was the key to their
success. Mainstream Gigante, largely because of the extensive scope of its operations and
its size, was much more slow-moving, operating within a mechanistic, highly bureaucratic
organisational structure. In contrast, International displayed many of the characteristics of
the smaller, organic structural paradigm. In particular, communications lines were flexible
and uncluttered and scant regard was paid to formal policies and procedures. International
was able to operate within this preferred mode largely because of its General Manager who,
apart from being highly respected and well liked by his team, was regarded as an astute
politician, intolerant of any outside interference in his Division’s operations. Thus he was
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able to act as an effective buffer between International and the mainstream organisation.
The Division’s geographical remoteness, plus minimum overlap between its operations and
the rest of the organisation, also contributed to its independence.
Nowhere was this style of working more evident than in International’s IT operations. Rapid
changes to production lines, the customer base and specific customer demands meant that
billing, orders and customer management systems had to be updated frequently and quickly.
Typically, a salesman working offshore would place an urgent call to the IT Manager and: 1)
request information required to finalise a quote; and 2) advise of system changes required to
support his prospective customer’s particular product demands. Unless the quote
information was provided overnight and the necessary system changes made within a
month (at the outside), it was highly likely that the deal would fall through. These sales
support requests were given top priority by the IT Department, activities were carried out ‘onthe-fly’ and, despite (or because of) its small size (12 people), the Department had compiled
an excellent and admirable record in meeting its deadlines. As such, it was considered to be
a major source of competitive advantage for International and was generally held in high
regard by colleagues – in sharp contrast to IT Departments in most organisations (OASIG,
1996).
This idyllic state of affairs came to an abrupt end in 1997 when Gigante entered into an
outsourcing deal with Worldwide Information Technology (WIT). A major player in IT
outsourcing, WIT had a hierarchical organisation structure, a predominately bureaucratic
mode of working and a culture similar in many respects to that of Gigante. (The reader might
well ask why an established and experienced player in the IT arena should outsource much
of its IT operations to another company operating in the same general business domain?
This is a question worthy of a study in its own right but a detailed investigation is beyond our
scope here.)
In this environment, the very features that were the essence of International’s strengths and
successes now were jeopardised. In particular, to have any systems maintenance or
enhancement work undertaken, work orders had to be prepared, and estimates and
program specifications had to be developed. All these were then passed upwards through
three layers of interface management on the Gigante side, then downwards through a
similar number of layers on the WIT side and, finally, each work order had to be vetted by
WIT’s Legal Department. Control, hierarchy and formal communication dampened the highly
innovative culture – the previous emphasis on flexibility and freedom, the horizontal and
informal.
Unconsulted prior to the establishment of the outsourcing arrangement or during the
preparation of detailed operating procedures (which were far from complete in a number of
important respects), International found itself in a very difficult position. With the procedures
as they stood, there was no way that its sales force or other operations management and
staff could continue to receive the level of IT service they had become accustomed to and
required: its staff lacked both the skills and the will to prepare the necessary documentation
and to negotiate their way through the system; unacceptable delays were intrinsic in the
procedures themselves; and the final blow came when their champion (the General
Manager) was promoted to an offshore position. Their problems were exacerbated when the
General Manager’s replacement displayed little understanding of the problems that
outsourcing had generated and less inclination to tackle them (or even discuss them!).
Moreover, he failed to comprehend the destruction of ‘the rose among the thorns’ of the
organisation.
Those in the IT Department have displayed considerable vigour in trying to obtain a better
deal for the Department, its systems and its Division. Essentially, they have simply refused
to relinquish control over their systems to WIT and the various parties involved in interface
management, and have continued to enhance and maintain their systems themselves. The
IT Manager, however, recognises that his resistance will inevitably have to end and is
devoting most of his energies to securing a better deal for his Division, plus improved
interface procedures. Moreover, while this state of affairs persists, International are not only
wearing the cost of their own internal staff performing actual work on their systems, but are
also paying WIT for that portion of their staff performing nominal work on International’s
systems!
4
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Perhaps the most depressing aspect of the whole case study, however, is the impact that
the outsourcing venture has had on the International IT Department’s morale. Effectively, a
vibrant (if unconventional) IT group, providing their customers with timely and excellent
service, has been shattered – in our view, probably beyond repair. Some staff have already
resigned (rather than take up the offer of moving across to WIT); most others are actively
seeking alternative employment; and the IT Manager, while continuing to fight his rearguard
action, is exhibiting some (understandable) signs of depression and even contemplating a
move into academia – if nothing else, he will have a wealth of first-hand information with
which to entertain his students!

A SYSTEM DYNAMICS VIEW
In arguing their case, International’s IT Department felt that they needed some quantitative
support. Intuitively, they were certain that outsourcing would have a major negative impact
on their bottom line but needed some means of demonstrating this. We were consulted and
suggested they develop a system dynamics model. Once the basic rationale and approach
(and, especially, the simulation capabilities of the ithink software employed) were outlined,
the IT Manager readily agreed to our suggestion and the model presented in Figure 1 was
developed. Note that, for the purposes of this paper, the model presented is somewhat
simplified.

Figure 1: Stock and Flow model of impact of delays on market share and revenue
International, as its name implies, operated in a global marketplace. It was one of only eight
companies marketing a very limited range of high-tech communications products – mostly to
medium-to-large, distributed organisations. Each product was designed for (essentially) the
same communications function and, at any given point in time, one product tended to
dominate the market (while other products were towards the beginning or end of their
lifecycles). The model presented in Figure 1 could be applied to any member of the product
range but was parameterised using the dominant product and, of course, International’s
operations relative to this particular product only.
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At the time development of our model commenced, International had a 20% market share of
the dominant product. Among the eight players, this placed it equal second overall but it was
rapidly increasing its share – mostly at the expense of its two major rivals. Our clients were
convinced that, within three months, they would be the clear leader – and, indeed, the trend
seemed to suggest that this was a reasonable assumption. No other player had more that
12% of the market. For the most part, International’s excellent performance was due to the
superb IT support its sales staff received (discussed in the previous section).
During modelling, a number of critical success factors were identified. Of these, there was
almost universal agreement that the two most vital were: i) the delay in getting into a new
(product) market; and ii) delays in responding to customer requirements after release of a
new product. These are included in Figure 1 as the converters, init delay rel to comps (initial
delay relative to competitors) and avge post imp delay rel to comps (average postimplementation delay relative to competitors). These determine both the initial and current
market share (init pct share and current pct share) and, together, these are used to calculate
International’s market share for any quarter, quarterly share). Using this and freely available
data on product traffic and lifecycle patterns, quarterly and cumulative traffic (market share)
and revenue can easily be calculated (for both International and its competitors). The model
was built up using data from obsolete products and those nearing the end of their lifecycle. It
was validated (to the extent possible) against the performance of the (current) dominant
product to the latest point in its lifecycle for which figures were available. Key simulation
outputs (revenue and market share figures) were shown to closely match actual product
performance.
Having developed the model, we were then able to run various forms of sensitivity analysis.
For example, Figure 2 illustrates the impact of variations in initial delays relative to
competitors on market share (with graphs 1-5 corresponding to 4 weeks faster, 2 weeks
faster, no difference, 2 weeks slower and 4 weeks slower respectively). A number of other
graphs were produced as a result of our analyses and, collectively, these dramatically
demonstrate the impact of both types of delay on International’s market share and revenue:
i.e. the modelling exercise produced precisely the type of ‘ammunition’ the IT Department
was seeking.

Figure 2: Delay impact on traffic share
As noted, however, the IT Department’s attempts to utilise these results have met with little
success. In retrospect, there was always a fair chance this would eventuate, given that key
decision makers were not included in the model building process (Vennix, 1996). Vennix’s
advice is sound and, in an ideal world, key stakeholders would always be involved in the
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development of important decision support models. The reality, though, is that, in many
modelling situations, this is simply not possible. For example, in the case under review here,
the size of the organisation, stakeholders’ other responsibilities, stakeholders’ geographical
dispersion and severe internal and external pressures on Gigante at the time of the study, all
mitigated against our attempts to get ‘buy in’ and active participation from the more
influential decision makers. Moreover, even if we had managed to realise our desired levels
of participation, we doubt it would have made a great deal of difference to the eventual
outcome: i.e. other factors - notably power/ political considerations were always going to
make life very difficult for both International and, particularly, its IT Department. We turn our
attention to these factors in the following section.

INTERNATIONAL’S INFLUENCE ATTEMPT: A WIDER VIEW
Gigante’s International Division (and, particularly, its IT Department) could clearly see the
devastation the outsourcing decision would wreak on their business. In their attempts to
alleviate the impact of this decision, they employed rational arguments. As we have seen,
however, much decision making in organisations is not rational. In this instance,
International’s concerns were dwarfed by a much bigger ‘game’ and, here, their lack of any
real political ‘clout’ counted very much against them. In the causal-loop diagram presented in
Figure 3, we have attempted to represent some of the major influences we detected as part
of this wider game.

Figure 3: Impact of allowing outsourcing exceptions
Organisations enter into IT outsourcing agreements for many reasons. During this study, we
heard considerable conjecture as to the ‘real’ reasons behind the Gigante/ WIT deal, but
press reports at the time consistently nominated major cost savings as Gigante’s principal
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motive for entering into the contract (one of the largest IT contracts ever signed by an
Australian company).
A special Program Management team (abbreviated as pm in Figure 3) was formed to
manage Gigante’s side of the alliance. From Figure 3, it can be seen that their performance
had a major effect on the success of the outsourcing venture. Furthermore, since most of
Gigante’s products require substantial IT support, outsourcing operations had a significant
impact on product performance and this, in turn, directly influenced Gigante’s bottom line. In
addition, the direct link from outsourcing perf to Gigante profit indicates that outsourcing, in
itself, was expected to contribute to profit through greatly decreased IT costs. Thus, this
portion of the diagram effectively mirrors Gigante’s official outsourcing policy and views.
However, other important factors were also at work. In particular, Gigante’s executive, the
Project Management team and the outsourcing agent (WIT) all stood to gain (and lose)
much from the outsourcing venture and links from Project Management team and agent
performance to rewards/ profit are clearly identified in Figure 3. In this context, it is easy to
see that exceptions (exemptions from the outsourcing arrangement) could clearly not be
tolerated. That is, apart from reducing the agent’s profit, every exception allowed was likely
to have a damaging impact on general perceptions of Project Management team
performance. Thus, Project Management implemented a policy to the effect that exceptions
would not be allowed under any circumstance – no matter what benefits specific cases might
have for individual products (and the systems and personnel that supported these). To
complete the picture, outsourcing can be a very risky business (Aubert et al., 2001) and
there were many (inside and outside Gigante) who doubted the wisdom of this particular
venture. Consequently, perceptions of the performance of Gigante’s executive were closely
linked to both the outsourcing operations themselves and the Project Management team.
Looked at in a (seemingly) rational light, the decision not to exempt International and their
systems from the outsourcing deal seems bizarre – ensuring as it did the eventual
destruction of International’s leadership in their particular product market, plus the additional
loss of a number of committed, scarce and valued IT specialists. If we view the situation
from a power/ political perspective, though, the events that transpired begin to make sense.
Pfeffer (1981; 1992) argues that while organisations have corporate (official) goals,
individual parties within these organisations have (unofficial) local goals: where there is a
clash between corporate and local goals, local goals generally take precedence. Pfeffer
(1981) goes on to define power as ‘a force, a store of political influence through which
events can be affected’, while politics ‘involves those activities or behaviours through which
power is developed and used within organisational settings’. In short, power is ‘a property of
the system at rest’ while politics is ‘power in action’. Pfeffer’s stores of influence are power
sources and, in his earlier work (1981:97-135) he discusses the more significant of these
within a very neat classification scheme. Using this scheme, we may investigate the impact
of a decision to allow outsourcing exceptions on the power sources of the three parties
discussed earlier in this section. Our results are presented in Table 1.
Clearly, all parties stood to lose substantially. The Project Management team and the agent
would have lost (shared) control over the provision of important resources (International’s
systems and IT personnel) to the organisation at large and, in addition, the agent would
have received less funds for its services. Furthermore, without control over these systems
and specialist personnel, the two parties’ total level of expert knowledge (a vital source of
power in organisations) would have suffered. Gigante’s executive, however, would have
been largely unaffected (in a direct sense) with respect to these power sources.
Perhaps, most interesting of all are the final three power sources in Table 1 and the fact that
all parties would have suffered here. As Pfeffer (1981:54-57) has argued, reputations are
built upon perceptions and, as noted previously, allowing exceptions would have had a
major negative impact on perceptions of Project Team performance. Actual performance
also has an effect on perceived pm perf and both these factors are clearly identified in our
causal-loop diagram. The link between perceptions of Project team and Gigante’s executive
performance is also identified. However, in Pfeffer’s scheme, there is also a clear link from
perceptions (of both power and performance) to prestige and extending our model to specify
this additional relationship is a relatively simple exercise. Finally, where an organisation unit
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or group has a strong, united, common view on issues, they derive power from consensus
(Pfeffer, 1981:122-124). Pfeffer emphasises that this is a particularly formidable power
source but one that can easily be dissipated by significant change. Allowing exceptions
would certainly fit into this category.
Project Management

Gigante Executive

Outsourcing
Agent

Resource provision

-

0

-

Resource dependence

-

0

-

Expert knowledge

-

0

-

Consensus

-

-

-

Reputation

-

-

-

Prestige

-

-

-

A ‘-’ means a negative impact, a ‘0’ means no impact and a ‘+’ means a positive impact

Table 1: Potential impact on power sources of a decision to grant International an
outsourcing exemption on the Project Management team, Gigante’s Executive and the
Outsourcing Agent

CONCLUSION
While collaboration strategy is not the answer to all organisational ills, it can be an effective
tool, although its success relates to a number of key variables touched on in this paper, the
critical one being that of managing organisational power plays and political activity
effectively.
What we find in this case study is a failure to learn from the process and to adjust
collaboration with an elasticity that would allow organisational roses to bloom rather than be
crushed underfoot by cooperative rigidities of structure, process, and regulatory ritual.
Furthermore, we see considerable self-interest and a consequent disregard for the vital role
played by individuals in collaboration processes. The results are that in accentuating rules
and efficiency, strategies for innovation and organisational learning were forgotten. This
rigidity, coupled with highly dysfunctional political activity, simply prevented realisation of
new possibilities available in multilateral organisational collaboration (Luts, 1997). Certainly
the case demonstrates many of the pitfalls and costs of inter-organisational collaboration,
especially so far as stakeholders in Cowboys/ International were concerned. Delineating
longer term benefits and overall organisational performance for Gigante may be more
difficult to assess but will be eagerly pursued.
Finally, organisational change increases the ‘turf warfare’ of change management – and part
of this includes the more macro dimensions of organisation prestige and reputation. In the
realm of any organisation’s corporate communication, the most critical function is that of the
organisation’s image and identity, important within the organisation but perhaps even more
vital to the external community and many of its key stakeholders. Diverse stakeholders may
have varying images of an organisation but reputation and identity should be consistent, a
hallmark that distinguishes it instantly in a globally competitive environment where attracting
the right customers, investors and employees is crucial. Image, identity, prestige and
reputation are today hallmarks of the qualitative intangibles based in perceptions and hard
fought for. They are part of an organisation’s intellectual capital in the broad sense and can
be irrevocably damaged even by one instance of poor management. Put simply, the
organisation is the message and poor communication (arising, for example, from the
politically-motivated turf warfare referred to above) can destroy it instantly!
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